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We discuss the software patent should be granted or not. There exist two types of
coping in the software market; reverse engineering and software duplication. Software
patent can prevent both types of copies since a patent protects an idea. If the software
is not protected by a patent, software producer cannot prevent reverse engineering.
However, the producer can prevent the software duplication by a copyright. It is not
clear the software patent is socially desirable when we consider these two types of
coping. We obtain the following results. First, the number of copy users under the
patent protection is greater than that under the copyright protection. Second, the
government can increase social welfare by applying copyright protection when the new
technology is suﬃciently innovative.
Keywords: Copyright Protection; Intellectual Property Right; Software
JEL Classication: D42; K39; L86
We thank Reiko Aoki, Dyuti Banerjee, Yongmin Chen, Taiji Furusawa, Hiroaki Ino, Kohei Kawamura,
Keith Masukus, Akira Okada, Suzanne Scotchmer and seminar participants at Hitotsubashi University for
helpful comments and discussions.
yyasuhiro68@gmail.com1 Introduction
Patents have been used to reward inventors for their developments. In the USA, patent law
grants right holders exclusive use only for inventions that are useful, new and nonobvious.
Bessen and Hunt (2004) and Aharonian (2005) report that the United States Patent and
Trademark Oﬃce (USPTO) grants more than 20,000 software patents a year. The number
of software patents is growing rapidly in the USA. On the other hand, software patents are
not granted by the European Patent Oﬃce (European Patent Convention Article 52). In
July 2005, the EU rejected the patent proposal called the Computer Implemented Inven-
tions Directive, and the European Patent Oﬃce announced that it would not grant software
patents. USPTO gives weight to the software producer’s incentive. The European Patent
Oﬃce, by contrast, focuses on the welfare loss from exclusive use. It is not clear which policy
is more socially desirable.
Many studies have investigated optimal patent protections. Gallini (1992) and Tan-
don (1982) discuss the optimal patent life by focusing on the basic tradeoﬀ problem be-
tween the producer surplus and the social welfare loss. Klemperer (1990) and Gilbert and
Shapiro (1990) consider the relationship between the patent length and the patent breadth.
O’Donoghue, Scotchmer and Thisse (1998) and Scotchmer and Green (1995) discuss the
optimal protection scheme with sequential innovation. However, it is diﬃcult to apply such
discussions to the software market because they do not consider speciﬁc properties of soft-
ware. In the software market, there are two types of copying: reverse engineering and
software duplication. Reverse engineering is copying by rival producers. For example, the
rival producers can steal innovative technology by reading the source code of the software.
They can improve the quality of their software by copying that technology. The literature
on patents mainly focuses on the theft of ideas by producers.
When we consider the software market, we must also consider software duplication. With
the emergence of computer technology, illegal copies of software are becoming increasingly
1easy to create and obtain. The Business Software Alliance (BSA, 2009) estimates that, in
2008, the illegal software market caused about US$53 billion in damages all over the world.
This paper discusses both types of copying to ascertain the optimal form of intellectual
property rights protection in the software market.
This analysis also focuses on the diﬀerences between patent and copyright since the
software may be protected by both the patent and the copyright. From a legal viewpoint,
there are many diﬀerences between these two forms of intellectual property rights. First,
there are diﬀerences among those who make copies. For instance, most copyrighted products
are copied by consumers. It is easy to copy a CD borrowed from a friend and enjoy it.
However, it is diﬃcult for a consumer to make a copy of a speciﬁc drug. Those who make
copies of patented products require technology to capture the innovative idea of the product.
Second, there are diﬀerences in the object protected by intellectual property rights. A patent
protects an “idea,” for example, how to make a speciﬁc medicine or innovative technology to
improve computer throughput. On the other hand, a copyright protects “expression,” such
as ﬁlms, books and video games.
Software can be protected by a patent if it contains an innovative “idea” to improve
eﬃciency or productivity. Similarly, software also can be protected by copyright because it is
an “expression” by a source code. We need to capture the diﬀerences to discuss the optimal
form of intellectual property right protection in the software market. As shown above, a
patent protects an “idea”, and therefore a producer can prevent both reverse engineering by
rival producers and software duplication by consumers. However, a copyright scheme cannot
prevent reverse engineering as it does not protect an idea. It is not clear which is more
beneﬁcial from a social point of view.
Although there are many diﬀerences between copyright and patent from a legal viewpoint,
they are treated in the same manner in economics. Economic analysis of intellectual property
rights sheds light on the tradeoﬀ between a producer’s incentive and social welfare. All
2intellectual property rights grant the right holders exclusive use of their goods to protect
producers’ incentives. On the other hand, these exclusive rights decrease the social surplus
owing to a monopoly situation. Many studies consider how to solve this trade-oﬀ problem.
According to the economics literature, copyright is identical to patents because both forms
of intellectual property rights share this tradeoﬀ problem.
Over the past few years, a number of empirical studies have been conducted on software
patents. For example, Lerner and Zhu (2007) and Mann and Sager (2007) reveal the impact
of software patent on the software development empirically. However, few attempts have
so far been made in theoretical research. Although some papers have considered software
(Church and Gandal, 1992; Ellison and Fudenberg, 2000; Varian, 2000; Banerjee, 2003), they
do not take into account diﬀerences between patent and copyright.
We obtain the following results. First, the number of copy users under the patent protec-
tion scheme is larger than that under the copyright protection scheme. Second, we compare
two intellectual property right protection schemes for the software market: patent and copy-
right. When the degree of innovation is small, there is no diﬀerence between the two schemes
because the rival producer does not steal the new technology. When the new technology is
suﬃciently innovative, governments can increase the quality of all software suﬃciently by
applying copyright protection. We show the eﬀect of improving producer’s quality and subse-
quent copying on protection. Recently, the necessity of software patents has been discussed.
We indicate that the government should not protect software by patents. The government
can increase social welfare by applying the appropriate copyright protection to provide suf-
ﬁcient incentive to producers.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the optimal patent protection.
In this section, theft of ideas by rival producers is prevented by a patent. We can obtain
the socially optimal level of protection against software duplication and of social welfare in
equilibrium. Section 3 discusses the optimal level of copyright protection against software
3duplication. In this section, we consider the case in which a rival producer can steal new
technology and improve its software quality. The government attempts to set the optimal
level of protection against software duplication in this situation. Section 4 then argues for
the optimal intellectual property right protection scheme in the software market. We can
compare social welfare in the equilibrium of the two schemes. This section reveals which
protection scheme is better from viewpoint of society. Section 5 concludes the discussion.
All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2 Patent Protection in the Software Market
We discuss the optimal patent protection in the software market. In this case, the rival
producer cannot copy new technology because of patent protection against reverse engineer-
ing. We consider two software producers in the market: producers 1 and 2. Both can produce
software of the lowest level of quality q2  0 1 without innovation. Producer 1 can improve
software quality to q1 = q2 +  with new technology.  denotes the degree of innovation.
Producer 1 decides whether to produce the innovative software with development cost F.
When producer 1 does not develop the new technology, producers set the price at zero and
play a Bertrand competition in the software market. We also assume that there are two types
of consumers: legal and illegal users. Legal users decide to purchase software from producer
1, producer 2 or neither. The consumer valuations of the software, each of which is denoted
by vi, are uniformly distributed on the interval [0;1]. Each consumer wants to buy at most
one unit. If consumer i purchases the software at its retail price pj (j = 1;2), the utility is
given by qjvi pj. Illegal users can make a perfect copy of the highest quality software at no
cost and their utility is given by qjvi. The ratio of legal users is 0  e  1, where e means
the parameter of enforcement set by the government. We present a multistage game model
1We do not allow producer 2 to decrease its quality for simplicity. We can obtain the same qualitative
conclusions even if we assume that the producer can decrease q2.
4to consider the optimal intellectual protection scheme. The four stages of the game have the
following rules.
1. Government sets e to maximize social welfare.
2. Producer 1 decides whether to develop the new technology  at development cost F.
3. Producers choose prices pj simultaneously.
4. Legal users decide whether they will purchase the software from producer 1 or purchase
nothing. Illegal users make copies of producer 1’s software.
The government’s goal is to maximize the social surplus, which is deﬁned as the sum
of the producers’ surplus and the consumers’ surplus. We analyze the subgame perfect
equilibrium by backward induction. First, let us consider consumer behavior.
Lemma 1

























All illegal users will make a copy of producer 1's software.
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Figure 1: Consumer behavior when p1q2 > p2q1
Consumer behavior thus depends on their valuation of the software quality and price. In
the ﬁrst case, legal users ignore software when their valuation of the software is lower than
the price of producer 2’s software. In the second case, the utility of purchasing producer 2’s
software is positive and higher than the utility of purchasing producer 1’s software. In the
third case, consumers prefer producer 1’s software to that of producer 2, because the utility
of software 1 is positive and higher. Figure 1 shows consumer behavior when p1q2 > p2q1.
In this class, consumers with valuations larger than (p1   p2)=(q1   q2) purchase producer
1’s software. Those with valuations between p2=q2 and (p1   p2)=(q1   q2) buy the software
from producer 2 and those with valuations less than p2=q2 do not consume. The legal users’
demand for producer 1’s software D1 and for that of producer 2 D2 when p1q2 > p2q1 are
thus given by



























Producers choose prices at the third stage. We consider their strategy in the next lemma.
6Lemma 2
(1) If 0  F < 4eq2
























(4q1   q2)2 : (5)
(2) If 4eq2
1(q1   q2)=(4q1   q2)2  F, then producer 1 does not develop the new technology
and as a result producers set pa
1 = pa
2 = 0.
We now consider the optimal level of patent protection against software duplication.
The government chooses protection level e to maximize social welfare, which is deﬁned as
the sum of producer surplus and consumer surplus. If producer 1 develops new technology,
the social welfare function is given by. The ﬁrst term denotes the sum of producer surplus
and consumer surplus from legal users. The second term represents the consumer surplus
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The next lemma shows how changes in protection aﬀect social welfare.
Lemma 3
(1) If 0  F < 4q2


















1(q1   q2)=(4q1   q2)2  F, then producer 1 does not develop the new technology
and as a result SW a(e) = q2=2 for all e.
The implication of this lemma is clear. Social surplus is a decreasing function of the pro-
tection level e because the number of consumers who use the software decreases as protection
increases. On the other hand, we can obtain the result that producer’s proﬁt is an increasing
function of protection from equations (4) and (5), because the number of consumers who
purchase the software increases as protection increases. If the government sets a low level
of protection e, a producer may decide to not develop the new technology because it cannot
compensate for its development cost. In such cases the social surplus will be q2=2 under
Bertrand competition. The next proposition shows the optimal level of patent protection ea
against software duplication.
Proposition 1







for 0  F <
4q2
1(q1   q2)
(4q1   q2)2 ;
e
a 2 [0;1] for F 
4q2
1(q1   q2)
(4q1   q2)2 :
Lemma 3 shows that the government desires to set the protection level e as low as possible.
Producer 1 may decide not to develop a new technology if the protection level is too low
because its proﬁt is an increasing function of e. Figure 2 shows this proposition. In the ﬁrst
case, setting the protection to zero will result in a negative proﬁt for producer 1 with the
development. The government sets e to provide suﬃcient incentive for development. The
level of protection is set just high enough to result in a nonnegative proﬁt after the invention.
In this case, producers set the prices at (2) and (3). In the second case, producer 1 will never
develop the new technology because the development cost is too high. If producer 1 does
not develop it, consumers can use the software without cost because producers set the price
at zero and play Bertrand competition. In this case, the social welfare does not depend on
the level of protection against software duplication because all software is provided at zero
price. Protection against software duplication increases as the development cost increases.
In the next section, we consider the optimal level of protection against software duplication
when the government applies a copyright protection scheme.
3 Copyright Protection in the Software Market
We consider how reverse engineering aﬀects the protection level e and social welfare
because copyright cannot prevent reverse engineering. When producer 1 develops the inno-
vative technology , producer 2 can decide whether to steal it by reading the source code.






Figure 2: Patent protection against software duplication
as follows.
1. Government sets e to maximize social welfare.
2. Producer 1 decides whether to develop the new technology  at a ﬁxed cost F > 0. If
producer 1 decides to develop it, producer 2 chooses a level of quality q2+ 0    
by reverse engineering.
3. Producers choose prices pj simultaneously.
4. Legal consumers decide whether they will purchase software from producer 1, producer
2 or neither. Illegal users make copies of producer 1’s software.
In this section, producer 2 can increase its software quality to maximize its proﬁt by
reverse engineering. We must consider how producer 2 applies the new technology. The next
lemma shows how changes in producers’ software quality aﬀect their surplus.
Lemma 4
If producer 1 develops the new technology , producer 2 decides its strategy as follows.
(1) Producer 2 chooses  = (4   3q2)=7 when  > 3q2=4.
10(2) Producer 2 does not improve its quality when   3q2=4.
The relationship between the quality and proﬁt of producer 2 depends on the degree of
. When  is large, producer 2 may copy the new technology. Producer 2 can increase the
software price and obtain higher proﬁt by reverse engineering. On the other hand, when
the degree of innovation is small, producer 2 has no incentive to steal the technology. In
this case, the proﬁt of producer 2 is decreased by reverse engineering because of severe price
competition. In this section, we focus on the case where  > 3q2=4. If  is small, the outcomes
are the same as discussed in Section 2. We can obtain the software producers’ strategies in
the next lemma.
Lemma 5













The prots of producers are
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(2) If 7e(q2 + )=48  F, then producers set pc
1 = pc
2 = 0.
The interpretation of this lemma is clear. In the ﬁrst case, producer 1 develops the
new technology and producer 2 copies it to maximize its own proﬁt, because the degree of
innovation is large and the development cost is low. When 7e(q2 + )=48  F < 4eq2
1(q1  
11q2)=(4q1   q2)2, the development cost F is so large that producer 1 cannot obtain suﬃcient
incentive to develop the new technology because producer 2’s copy decreases producer 1’s
proﬁt. When F > 4eq2
1(q1 q2)=(4q1 q2)2, producer 1 does not develop the new technology
because the development cost is too high. Consequently, producer 1 does not develop the
new technology when F  7e(q2 + )=48.
When the new technology is suﬃciently innovative ( > 3q2=4) and the development cost































The ﬁrst term means the sum of the consumer surplus from legal buyers and the producer
surplus. The second term means consumer surplus from illegal use. In these cases, the quality
of both producers’ products is increased by the new technology. The following lemma shows
the impact of protection against software duplication on social welfare when there is reverse
engineering in the market.
Lemma 6















(2) If 7(q2 + )=48  F, then SW c(e) = q2=2 for all e.
12This lemma can be interpreted in the same manner as Lemma 4. The following proposi-
tion discusses the optimal level of protection against software duplication e
2.
Proposition 2














This result can be interpreted in the same manner as Proposition 1. Figure 3 shows this
proposition. The government desires to set the protection as low as possible to maximize
social surplus. However, it must set at a high enough level of protection to prevent producer
1’s proﬁt from being negative. In the ﬁrst case, producer 2 applies the new technology
to maximize its proﬁt. The government takes into account producer 2’s copying to set the
protection level. In the second case, producer 1 will never develop the new technology because
of the high development cost and producer 2’s copying. When the degree of innovation is
not large, producer 2 does not have an incentive to copy the new technology. In this case,
the optimal protection level is the same as in Proposition 1.
4 Patent Protection vs. Copyright Protection
Thus far, we have considered two intellectual property right protection schemes, one that
does not consider a producer’s reverse engineering and another that does. The government
can decide the level of protection against software duplication to maximize social welfare.
However, the government also has the option of preventing reverse engineering by producer






Figure 3: Copyright protection against software duplication
prevent reverse engineering; however, copyright cannot. In this section, we consider which
protection scheme is better from the viewpoint of society: copyright or patent protection.
The next proposition compares the levels of protection against the software duplication.
Proposition 3
When F < 7(q2+)=48, the number of copy users in the market under a copyright scheme
is smaller than that under a patent scheme.
The intuition of this proposition is clear. When the degree of innovation is not large, the
level of protection against software duplication is the same for a patent and copyright because
producer 2 does not copy. When the degree of innovation is large and the development cost
is small (F < 7(q2 +)=48), the protection levels diﬀer (Figure 4). If the government adopts
a copyright protection scheme, producer 1’s proﬁt may decrease as a result of producer 2’s
reverse engineering. In this case, the government must increase protection against software
duplication to provide suﬃcient incentive for producer 1. If the development cost is not
small (7(q2+)=48  F), the government cannot compensate producer 1 for its development





















Figure 4: Protection against the software duplication
Proposition 4
From the viewpoint of society, the government should apply the copyright protection
scheme in the software market when F < 7(q2 + )=48. Otherwise, the government should
apply a patent protection scheme.
Figure 5 compares the social welfare under both schemes. When the degree of innova-
tion is small, there are no diﬀerences between the two schemes, because producer 2 does
not steal the new technology. When the new technology is suﬃciently innovative and the
development cost is low, the government can increase the quality of all software by relax-
ing protection against software duplication. In addition, if the government applies patent
protection, producer 1’s market power becomes very strong. This is not desirable from the
viewpoint of social welfare. However, producer 1 does not obtain enough proﬁt to develop
the new technology under the copyright protection scheme when F  7(q2 + )=48. In this
case, the government should prevent copying by producer 2 with a patent protection scheme.
This proposition also shows the relationship between the protection scheme and the idea. If
we deﬁne the idea as a combination of the degree of innovation  and the development cost



























Figure 6: Optimal protection scheme
16that the innovative idea, for example where  is large and F is small, should be protected by
a copyright scheme. Proposition 4 describes the eﬀect of producer 1 improving quality and
the subsequent copying on protection. In the USA, there are debates over protection of soft-
ware by patents. In the software market, the quality of software is improved incrementally
with each update. If the original technology q2 is large and the degree of innovation  is not,
the range of development costs within which the patent protection scheme is socially desir-
able becomes small. Therefore, this proposition posits that the government should not use
patents to protect software, but should provide more stringent protection against software
duplication than for other copyrighted products.
5 Conclusion
We have considered whether software should be protected by patents. To discuss this
problem, we need to take into account the diﬀerences between patent and copyright pro-
tection because software is protected by both forms of intellectual property rights. In this
paper, patent protection and copyright protection are simply distinguished by changing the
identity of the player who copies. We discussed intellectual property right protection in a
model wherein (a) the government controls the level of protection against software duplica-
tion and against reverse engineering to maximize social welfare and (b) a software company
can develop a new technology by incurring certain costs. We obtain the following results.
First, the level of protection against software duplication under the patent scheme is
smaller than that under the copyright scheme when the development cost is not large. If
there is reverse engineering in the market, protection against software duplication becomes
strong. Consequently, the number of copy users under the copyright protection scheme is
less than that under the patent protection scheme. Second, we show the optimal intellectual
property right protection scheme in the software market. When the degree of innovation is
17small, there is no diﬀerence between the two schemes because the rival producer does not steal
the technology. When the new technology is suﬃciently innovative and the development cost
is low, the government can increase social surplus by adopting copyright protection against
software duplication. On the other hand, the government must apply a patent protection
scheme when the development cost is high because producer 1 cannot obtain suﬃcient proﬁt
to develop software under a copyright protection scheme. We show the eﬀect of improving
the quality of software from a producer and subsequent copying on protection. Our analysis
suggests that changes should be made with regard to the direction of modern copyright and
patent policy. We indicate the importance of copyright protection in the software market.
We close this paper by pointing out some extensions of this model. First, we have
assumed that the government can prevent copying by producer 2 perfectly under a patent
protection scheme and that the government does not prevent reverse engineering at all under
a copyright protection scheme. However, in reality the government can control the degree
of reverse engineering by setting the breadth of the software patent. If we consider the case
in which the government can set the upper limit of reverse engineering , we can discuss
the optimal intellectual property right protection scheme in the software market. We can
obtain a similar result under this setting. When the development cost is low, copyright is
more socially desirable than patent protection in the software market. The optimal level of
protection against software duplication in this case is given by Figure 7. The intuition of
this ﬁgure is clear. When the development cost is high, the government can decrease the
degree of reverse engineering to permit development by producer 1. Consequently, the level
of protection against software duplication becomes lower than in the ﬁrst case.
Second, in this paper, the government can control the protection level e directly. However,
the government controls this protection level through other policies such as a penalty for
copyright infringement. It would be interesting to endogenize e. Third, producer 1 has the
option of granting an exclusive license to producer 2. Patent protection may be better than












Figure 7: Optimal protection against software duplication
to set high levels of protection against software duplication because producer 1 can obtain a
license fee from producer 2. Fourth, we assume that the cost of reverse engineering is zero
in this model. In reality, it is diﬃcult to acquire all information from reverse engineering.
The rival producer must pay some costs to do that. Considering this cost, the range within
which patent and copyright protection are indiﬀerent from the viewpoint of society becomes
large.
In addition, we have attempted to capture speciﬁc properties of software. However,
this is not enough. As Scotchmer (1991) states, cumulative innovation is a very important
topic with regard to software. For example, the quality of software improves sequentially
as it is updated. Ellison and Fudenberg (2000) argue that monopolists have incentives to
provide upgraded versions of the software. The arguments presented for patent protection
for sequential innovation (Scotchmer and Green, 1990; O’Donoghue, 1998; O’Donoghue,
Scotchmer, and Thisse, 1998; Bessen and Maskin, 2000) are helpful when considering this
problem. These extensions will be the basis for future research. We also assume that the
quality without the innovation is common to both producers. However, there are diﬀerences
in technical capabilities among software producers. If we assume that one producer’s software
quality without the innovation is higher than that of the other producer’s, we obtain a similar
19result to that in this paper.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
In this lemma, we consider the optimal consumer behavior. In the ﬁrst case, consumers
choose to not consume the product because the utility of buying is negative. We obtain the
equations
0 > q1vi   p1; 0 > q2vi   p2:
21In the second case, when consumers use producer 2’s software, they obtain a higher utility
than when buying producer 1’s software or when not using it at all. We therefore obtain the
equations
q2vi   p2 > q1vi   p1; q2vi   p2  0:
In the third case, when consumers use producer 1’s software, they obtain a higher utility
than when consuming producer 2’s software or using none at all. We therefore obtain the
equations
q1vi   p1  q2vi   p2; q1vi   p  0:
The lemma follows from these equations. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
We deﬁne the producers’ strategy as S = f(p1;p2) j p1  0;p2  0g, where pj(j = 1;2) is
the retail price of software. For convenience of analysis, we divide the strategy space S into
two subclasses: S1 = f(p1;p2) j p1q2  p2q1g and S2 = f(p1;p2) j p1q2 < p2q1g.
When producers employ strategies in subclass S1, the consumer behavior is illustrated
in Figure 1. Consumers with valuations larger than (p1   p2)=(q1   q2) purchase producer
1’s software; those with valuations between p2=q2 and (p1   p2)=(q1   q2) buy the software
from producer 2 and those with valuations less than p2=q2 do not consume. The legal users’
demand for producer 1’s software D1 and the demand for producer 2’s software D2 when
p1q2 > p2q1 are thus given by










22From these equations, we also obtain











Producers decide on a price to maximize their proﬁt in subclass S1 simultaneously. The























(4q1   q2)2 :
When producers employ strategies in subclass S2, producer 2’s payoﬀ becomes zero be-
cause there are no consumers who purchase producer 2’s software in the market. In this
class, producer 2 has an incentive to decrease its prices to a level that satisﬁes p1q2  p2q1.
Consequently, the strategies in subclass S1 become the equilibrium outcomes over the whole
strategy space S. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3




1   q1q2   2q2
2)








q1(q1   q2)(4q1   3q2)
2(4q1   q2)2 < 0:
The social welfare is a decreasing function of the protection level e when the new tech-
nology is developed. The technology will not be developed, however, if the proﬁt is negative.
The producer’s proﬁt depends on the degree of  and F, and is an increasing function of e.
In the case of 0  F < 4q2
1(q1   q2)=(4q1   q2)2, if the protection is so low that the pro-
ducer’s proﬁt is negative, producer 1 will not develop the new technology and play Bertrand
competition. In the last case, the development cost is larger than the maximum proﬁt of the
producer. In this case, the new technology will not be developed for any e. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 3, the social welfare is a decreasing function of the protection level e if
the new technology is developed. In the ﬁrst case, the protection should be chosen at the
minimum level that provides an incentive for the producer to develop, because the new
technology is socially desirable in this range of development cost. In the second case, the
producer cannot develop the technology for any e. The government’s optimal penalty is
therefore unconstrained. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4












(4q1   q2)3 :
Producer 2’s proﬁt is maximized when 4q1 = 7q2. Producer 2 can increase its proﬁt by
reverse engineering when  is larger than 3q2=4. When  is larger than the limit, producer
2 chooses  to be 4(q2 + ) = 7(q2 + ). Therefore, producer 2 chooses  = (4   3q2)=7 to
maximize its proﬁt. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5
From Lemma 4, producer 2 improves its quality to 4q1=7 when producer 1 develops the







































In the second case, producer 1 will not develop the technology because the development cost
is too high. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6
When the new technology is suﬃciently innovative ( > 3q2=4) and the development cost
is smaller than producer 1’s proﬁt (0  F < 7e(q2 + )=48), social welfare when producer 2
25steals the new technology that is developed by producer 1 is given by
SW
c(e) =










The social welfare is thus a decreasing function of e when the technology is developed
by producer 1. Producer 1 will not develop the new technology if its proﬁt is negative. The
proﬁt depends on the magnitude of  and F, and is an increasing function of e. In the ﬁrst
case, producer 1 does not develop the new technology because e is too small to compensate
for the development cost when producer 2 copies it. When the development cost is large
(F  7(q2 + )=48), producer 1 does not develop the new technology because its proﬁt
becomes negative even if e = 1. Therefore, producers play Bertrand competition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
From Lemma 6, the social surplus is a decreasing function of e when the technology
is developed. In the ﬁrst and second cases, protection is chosen at the minimum level
that provides an incentive for a producer to work. In the last case, the producer cannot
aﬀord to develop the technology for any e. The optimal government protection is therefore
unconstrained. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3
We compare the optimal protection level ea and ec.











F(21q2 + 20)(4   3q2)
28(q2 + )2
(8)
26This equation becomes negative when  > 3q2=4.
From equation (8), the level of protection against software duplication under copyright pro-
tection is more severe than that under patent protection when the development cost is low.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
We compare social welfare under each penalty scheme. We obtain the social surplus when
reverse engineering does not exist in the market by substituting ea into equation (6):
SW
a =
4(q2 + )2   F(9q2 + 12)
8(q2 + )
for 0  F <
4q2
1(q1   q2)








(4q1   q2)2 :




7(q2 + )   18F
14












We compare equations (9) and (10).
4(q2 + )2   F(9q2 + 12)
8(q2 + )
 






This equation becomes negative when  > 3q2=4.
We compare equations (9) and (11):






27Therefore, social welfare under copyright protection when F is large is smaller than that
under patent protection. Q.E.D.
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